“Climb the mountains and get their good tidings. Nature’s peace will flow into you as sunshine into trees.”  --John Muir

Concerned Philosophers for Peace  
October 25-26, 2013  
Yosemite National Park

Conference Program

Meeting Room: Yosemite Lodge “Cliff Room”
Thursday Oct. 24, 7 PM Informal Social: Yosemite Lodge—Mountain Room Lounge

Friday, October 25


9:35-10:10  Ron Hirschbein, “A Brief (albeit ironic) History of Terrorism”

10:10-10:45  Michael Fox, “Reflections on Violence”

10:45-11  Break

11-11:35  Blake Hereth, “Mactatus Pro Familia”

11:35-12:10  Damon Boria, “Guerrilla Gardening for Peace: Existentialist Ethics in Food Deserts”

12:10-12:45  Jonathan McConnell, “The Accident reveals The Substance: Virilio’s Eschatological Philosophy and the Crisis of Food”

12:45-2  Lunch


3:10-3:20  Break


3:55-4:30  Michael Hemmingson, “Edmund Burke and Green Political Thought: Environmental and Social Conservatisms”

4:30-5:00  Break

5:00-6:15  John Muir in Yosemite (with Frank Helling, John Muir Impersonator and Harold Wood, Sierra Club Historian)
Saturday, October 26


9:35-10:10  Aaron Fehir, “The Problem of Conflicting Truth-Claims and the Potential for Peace”

10:10-10:45  James Sterba, “Peace Though Justice”

10:45-11  Break


11:35-12:10  Dennis Rothermel, “Hope, Desperation, and Catastrophe in International Lines of Flight in Four Contemporary Films”

12:10-12:45  Elina Minnullina and Marc Lucht, “Tolerance, Dialogue, and Interconfessional Harmony in Tatarstan”

12:45-2  Lunch


2:35-3:10  Duane Cady, “Warism and Environmentalism”

3:10-3:20  Break


4:30-5:15  BUSINESS MEETING

5:15-6  Andrew Fitz-Gibbon, PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS
Abstracts

David Boersema, “Sequoyah and Seattle: Chief World Systems”

Chief Sequoyah (c. 1770-1843) and Chief Seattle (c. 1780-1866) are the namesakes of two iconic aspects—often deemed to be in conflict with each other—of human lived-experience: the sequoia tree and a modern major metropolitan city. Ironically, Chief Sequoyah was not an environmentalist in the sense that the term is used or understood today; rather his notoriety is based on constructing a written form of the Cherokee language. At the same time, Chief Seattle was an environmentalist in today’s sense, known during his lifetime and after for bemoaning what he saw as the failure of white settlers to possess any sense of spiritual connection to the natural world. In this paper, I examine the respective work of Chief Sequoyah and Chief Seattle and suggest that the apparent incongruity of their lives with their namesakes is indeed only apparent and not substantive. I consider what it significant about language and also about metropolitanism such that they are indeed consistent with each other as well as with both the nature of peace and the peace of nature. I suggest that both interpersonal peace and intrapersonal (spiritual) peace are interrelated in ways that rely on linguistic and spatial (including cosmopolitan) phenomena and lived-experience.

Ron Hirschbein, “A Brief (albeit ironic) History of Terrorism”

Look at the actual history [of terrorism], not the one that's written . . . I could even maybe suggest it as a research topic to some enterprising graduate student who aspires to a career as a taxi driver. —Noam Chomsky

Nothing worse than a terrorist, not even a child molester. Far and away, terrorism is the worst thing that can happen. A family is murdered: it could have been worse—thank God it wasn’t a terrorist act! A plane crashes, but survivors take comfort; they know it wasn’t terrorism. Terrorist! The ultimate opprobrium: the all purpose term of derision; a rhetorical artifact invoked to disparage opponents, indict their behavior, and stop any semblance of critical reflection. (“Communist” is so 1960s.)

I begin by considering the epithet’s shamelessly, promiscuous usage. It's applied to everything from the tiresome rerun known as partisan politics to jihadists in faraway places with strange sounding names. An obvious question follows: What is terrorism?

Chomsky probably got it right when he quipped terrorism is violence you don't like. However, it's revealing to examine tendentious official definitions. These definitions seem apt till we read the linguistic legerdemain, the magical caveats that make US terrorism vanish. "Respectable" analysts unscrupulously eliminate the possibility that their favored nation engages in this most odious of evils. Any sense of proportionality vanishes: How much does it exaggerate to suggest that for every noncombatant killed by the terrorist diaspora, a million have been killed by legitimate nation-states? (In his apologia, McNamara laments that his putatively well-intentioned, but ill-conceived, Vietnam policy resulted in the deaths of perhaps a million Asians.)

Now the promised irony: Terrorism didn't always get bad press, on the contrary. If we care to look—and we will—we’ll discover that "terrorism" was once cause for celebration. During World War II and the bipolar disorder known as the Cold War, terrorism was honored, even deemed miraculous. Reminiscing about the terror bombing he orchestrated during the War, Gen. Curtis LeMay allowed: "Killing Japanese didn't bother me very much at that time... I suppose if I had lost the war, I would have been tried as a war criminal."1

Officialdom credited what they lauded as "nuclear terrorism" with accomplishing what Christ couldn't do: ushering in peace on earth without good will toward men. As Churchill famously averred: "By a process of sublime irony [we] have reached a state where safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation."2 In 1958, Rand strategist Albert Wohlstetter published a highly influential essay (reportedly, it profoundly influenced MacNamra) entitled "The Delicate Balance of Terror," in Foreign Affairs. He advocated

1http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/c/curtislema228405.html#0A53WG64PFuFaPx.99
developing and deploying sufficient weaponry to destroy half the Soviet population—in order to properly titrate the balance.³

Times change. Terrorism got bad press; and so the name of the game changed: The venerable "balance of terror" became the "balance of power." "Terrorism" became the apotheosis of evil. Even so, fun-loving George W. Bush saw the humor in all this. "Shock and Awe" (what better name for a terrorist campaign?) turned to "Awe Shucks": lies about weapons of mass destruction became a laughing matter at the President's burlesque during the 2003 Correspondents' Dinner.

Michael Fox, “Reflections on Violence”

Violence, we will all agree, is one of the biggest problems faced by individual members of society, as well as by groups and nations. Anyone wishing to promote peace must first consider what violence is and what we are up against in facing it. This paper looks at the nature of violence, and attempts to see beyond the limits of a violence-prone society.

A common assumption is that violence is so ingrained in human nature that we will never be free of it, or of war. This belief is challenged by many anthropologists who have studied peaceful societies and by other social scientists, who have charted historical trends in regard to warfare and violence. As philosophers for peace, we must unanimously reject any belief that humans are genetically predestined to be warlike.

I first define violence and examine its many manifestations. I then refute the claim that humans are innately violent. I distinguish between justified (morally condoned) and legitimate (legitimated or legally permitted) violence and explain their relationship. The discussion then turns to how legitimate violence may become pervasive in the institutional or structural features of a society, and how non-legitimate forms of violence, as spin-off effects of legitimate violence, can also become embedded in the social fabric. The general point toward which these various observations tend is that violence is socially constructed and therefore subject to control by the adoption of different social dynamics. Violence is largely learned, and can therefore be unlearned. To do this requires paying careful attention to real human needs, and reinforcements aimed at cultivating nonviolent solutions to human problems.

In conclusion, I explain the ineffectiveness of violence in obtaining our objectives, and the many kinds of brutalizing and damaging effects violence produces. Both the victims and the perpetrators of violence are at risk. The moral of this story would seem to be that if we want a society and a world in which there is less violence, the conditions causing violence are better understood, violence is more under personal and group control, and there are attractive and meaningful alternatives to violence as a means of self-expression and/or behavior modification in others, then we have to take steps to realize these goals. Only in this way can we hope to progress toward the creation, one day, of a culture of peace.

Blake Hereth, “Mactatus Pro Familia”

Pacifism is the moral doctrine that, necessarily, there is no moral property p such that, if p were instantiated, then acting violently toward a person would be morally justified. Basic person-relative duties (that is, duties that concern basic needs and rights, and which are owed as a result of some moral contract) might be regarded as potentially threatening to pacifism. The worry is that certain person-relative duties, such as the duty to protect one’s family (because they are one’s family), counterfactually imply propositions whose truth is logically inconsistent with pacifism (as sketched previously). I argue that there are no person-relative duties of the pacifist-threatening sort and conclude that pacifism, barring other objections, is in the clear. Basic, person-relative duties inconsistent with pacifism imply moral impossibilities: (1) our initial person-invariant duties, such as a duty to refrain from murder, are possibly (comparatively) unimportant duties; (2) either we can abandon moral duties altogether, or it is permissible to abrogate prior duties by bringing about higher-order duties. But murder, like killing persons in general, is very seriously wrong; there is an intrinsically strong duty to refrain from murdering. It is likewise mistaken to suppose that we can, via successive normative weight addition, come to abandon our moral duties, or adopt conflicting duties when our current duties forbid doing so.

³ http://www.rand.org/about/history/wohlstetter/P1472/P1472.html
**Damon Boria, “Guerrilla Gardening for Peace: Existentialist Ethics in Food Deserts”**

In February 2013 Ron Finley, an artist from South Central Los Angeles, delivered a TED Talk in which he argued that “Gardening is the most therapeutic and defiant act you can do, especially in the inner city.”⁴ For Finley, it is an act of defiance insofar as it is a rejection of numerous afflictions. Most notably, in the inner (American) city, gardening is defiance against “food deserts.” In such urban areas, people have little or no access to affordable fresh food. As Finley is quick to point out, one of the biggest reasons this is problematic is because those most vulnerable—those with the fewest means, such as children, the elderly and the poor—are left exposed to only unhealthy food. This leads, of course, only to more poor health and poverty, which, in turn, lead to more social fragmentation and violence in urban areas already suffering from such afflictions. So, gardening, or, more precisely, “guerilla gardening”—where unused (and often prohibited) spaces are seized—can be therapeutic insofar as it empowers individuals to take control of their lives while simultaneously fostering greater social cooperation.

In this paper I argue that guerilla gardening can, in the interest of promoting peace, be creatively informed by existentialist ethics and, conversely, existentialist ethics can be creatively informed by such defiant acts. Part of my argument focuses on the similarities between guerilla gardening and Jean-Paul Sartre’s efforts in the 1960s and 1970s to live his existentialist ethics by supporting the occupations of empty buildings to give to the homeless and grocery stores to give food to the poor.⁵ But my argument is also developed through theoretical considerations of need as the basis for moral authority, the meaning of interdependence for freedom, and the reasons why authenticity in today’s world requires (at least an effort to be) green-thumbed. These considerations point toward a radicalization of guerilla gardening such that it is positioned as part of more sweeping fundamental social changes. I conclude with some remarks about how existentialism and ecologically-centered projects such as guerilla gardening agree where it matters most. As Finley put it, “[don’t] talk about doing some shit. …Come to the garden, with your shovel, so we can plant some shit.”

**Jonathan McConnell, “The Accident reveals The Substance: Virilio’s Eschatological Philosophy and the Crisis of Food”**

Following Aristotle’s claim that ‘the accident reveals the substance’, Paul Virilio reasons “the invention of the ‘substance’ is equally invention of the ‘accident’” (The Original Accident, 5). In December of 1984, a Union Carbide chemical plant in Bhopal, India accidentally released a toxic gas cloud from a tank containing methyl isocyanate, a chemical used to create the pesticide Sevin, killing between 10,000 and 25,000 people and poisoning hundreds of thousands more -- history’s largest industrial disaster. The legal fight for justice for Bhopal victims is a struggle against bureaucratically deferred responsibility. This legal fight, however, overshadows a more fundamental culpability and irrationality that Virilio’s formula brings forth: an agricultural model that cosubstantiates food (the substance) with poison (the accidental quality). In other words, the root of the Bhopal Disaster is not poor management by Union Carbide or even systematic disregard for the safety of developing nations by global capitalism, but the creation of a food industry that relies on poison for its existence.

The last decade has seen an explosion of popular audience Post-Green Revolution Food Movement texts, such as Michael Pollan’s book The Omnivore’s Dilemma and the documentary film King Corn, that attempt to make visible the irrational and life-denying practices of industrial agriculture. These efforts largely examine the ecological, economical, social, and health dangers of a system that already exists. Virilio’s claim, however, is that the acceleration of Progress that largely defines our modern era calls for an eschatological philosophy that uncovers the accident before the substance becomes universally accepted. In Virilio’s vision of a quickly accelerating totality, accidents will no longer be local, but global and total. In this paper, I focus on the unique role of agriculture and food production in such an eschatological philosophy. Furthermore, I ask how we can heed warnings inherent in the substance of progress rather than just react to the accidents. In approaching this question of warnings, I look at marginalia from Earl L. Butz’s review copy of Wendell Berry’s 1975 book The Unsettling of America. Berry was writing about the dangers of the Green Revolution as crises of character, agriculture, and culture and specifically targeted for critique Butz’ policies as U.S. Secretary of Agriculture under Presidents Nixon and Ford. Butz published a review of Berry’s book in 1978, and the marginalia of his review copy illuminates how incomprehensible a philosophy of crisis is to an architect of progress. The critical question remains how to identify

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⁴ http://www.ted.com/speakers/ron_finley.html
ecological and humanitarian violence not by looking at accidents and disasters, but at the substance that calls forth such disasters.

**Michael Hemmingson, “Edmund Burke and Green Political Thought: Environmental and Social Conservatisms”**

In this paper I examine the argument, put forward by Nicholas Holm among others, that green political thought is an inherently conservative enterprise, due to its distinguishing between “natural” and “unnatural” states of affairs, valorising the former and denigrating the latter. It is questionable, of course, what it means for something to be “natural” – Holm uses the example of the vilification of urban wildlife to illustrate how this category is socially constructed. Furthermore, he questions whether, if this socially constructed category of nature has conservative implications for the environment, this way of thinking might have conservative political implications in the social realm also.

I argue that it does not. Though there are clear parallels between green political thought and the thought of conservative philosopher Edmund Burke, in particular the concept of the “precautionary principle” – that change, when it occurs, should occur slowly – and a criticism of the hubris of liberal thought – arguing against the idea that we have the capacity to change and improve complex systems with rational planning – it is nevertheless the case that there are important differences between the two political views.

In particular, while both identify limits to humankind’s rational mastery, and so advocate caution in change, they differ importantly on the reason for these limits. In Burke’s case, he argues that it is human nature that provides the hard limit on human activity. If we try to change society in disregard of human nature, the consequences will be dire, he thinks. Hence, Burkean thought is inherently socially conservative.

Green political thought, on the other hand, holds that our limits are regarding the capacity of the environment to adapt to the scale and rapidity of humankind’s physical interventions. Hence, while green thought conservatively recommends reducing the scale of our activities, and has a general attitude of “let’s leave well enough alone,” and while it certainly could be socially conservative in extreme cases in which, for example, the pursuit of social equality comes up against the capacity of the environment to adapt to human interventions, on the whole green thought can separate its environmental conservatism from Burkean social conservatism.

As such, I conclude that Holm is mistaken in his critique of green political thought: while green certainly utilise the tools of Burkean conservatism in some respects, this does not bleed over into green social policy (and, in fact, greens tend towards supporting progressive social policy, for reasons I won’t get into here). Hence, it is possible to separate the green environmental conservatism from Burkean social conservatism.

**Eric Mathison, “War and Greenpeace: Liberalism and the Responsibility of Developed Countries”**

A common view is that as the climate continues to force humans to adapt to new, often worse, circumstances, the rate of human violence will increase. Wars over natural resources, especially water and access to food, will become more common. This view provides us with yet another reason to prevent climate change. The violence–climate change connection is popular. For example, Al Gore and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change won the Nobel Peace Prize for their work on preventing climate change. Similarly, Thomas Homer-Dixon argues in a New York Times opinions article that climate change is a threat to international security.⁶

Unfortunately, and I say more below about why this is unfortunate, studies have not found any clear connection between violence and climate change.⁷ In fact, there is evidence (and explanation) for the opposite: that as climate change has become more pronounced the world has become more peaceful. Erik Gartzke states that “[the incidence of [militarized state disputes] has dropped at roughly the same time that the effects of climate change become apparent.”⁸ The explanation for the reduction of interstate wars is that, since the Second World War, countries have become increasingly democratic and focused on economic development. The latter factor, in particular, decreases the attractiveness of going to war, as insecurity reduces trade opportunities.⁹

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The poor link between climate change and conflict means that fixing the climate is no guarantee to peace. Worse still, the reason why conflict seems to be decreasing—economic development, which is the root of anthropogenic climate change—is directly at odds with protecting the planet. At least in the medium term, free market liberals are faced with a difficult choice: Protect the planet to the detriment of the world's worst off (both because they will remain impoverished, which is a justice issue, and because war is more likely), or help improve undeveloped countries' economies to the detriment of the environment. Of course, promoting this second option will lead to more environmental justice issues, and raise the likelihood of increased (perhaps global) ecological destruction. The choice gets very close to being a dilemma.

A third option exists, and it is the one for which I shall argue in this paper. Given that the large majority of anthropogenic climate change is caused by the richest countries, it is already commonly held that the rich have a greater responsibility to address environmental damage. My argument shall be that the “environment or peace” dilemma, despite its other elements, is additional reason for developed countries to lower their emissions, thereby decreasing the threat to the climate, but also allowing poor countries to develop without causing as much environmental damage. Undeveloped countries, I shall argue, have a right to development, both because it is better for individuals and because it reduces the risk of war. In other words, they can focus on development (within limits) with some detriment to the environment. At the same time, developed countries have an even greater responsibility to reduce the global ecological footprint without preventing development elsewhere. Preventing development violates human justice; allowing climate change violates environmental justice. By avoiding both developed countries will be protecting the planet and preventing war.

Solomon Laleye, “Duty Ethics as Complement for Resolving Socio-Political Conflict in Africa”

There is no mono-causal factor for violent-conflict especially in Africa. Conflict analysts have therefore identified some possible causes of violent-conflict among the pluralistic societies in Africa. In this wise, colonialism is seen by some as a catalyst in the chemistry of violent-conflict in Africa. Some fingered the denial of basic human existential and social needs as a sufficient cause of violent conflict. Some other scholars opted for the deficiencies in the organization and the administration of the society to be responsible for violent-conflict etc. In line with the identified causes; suggestions that culminated in resolution mechanisms are made to tame the high spate of violence in African society. Central to all the proffered resolution mechanisms is the emphasis on human rights. This recognition of rights is germane because every conflict involves claims and counter claims to rights, the violation of any of which is perceived by the disputants as an act of injustice that must be redressed. The satisfactory protection of these rights is therefore expected to result into enduring peaceful co-existence. It is against this background that the protection of rights serves as the preferred platform for resolving conflict and violent conflict.

In spite of the emphasis on the protection of rights, efforts at preventing conflict or its degenerating into violence have yielded marginal benefits. Conflicts continue to be present in different parts of Africa. This suggests that attempts to resolve conflicts, with emphasis on the recognition and respect for the relevant rights of stakeholders on conflict are inadequate. Consequently, the important questions this paper addresses include; why is it that many of the previous efforts to resolve conflict fail to achieve enduring results? Is there any way we can complement existing conflict resolution techniques, based on the respect of rights, to make them more productive? In effect, the basic problem this paper addresses is that of how to provide an adequate philosophical framework within which conflicts can be constructively handled as to prevent them from degenerating into violence? Such foundation would also be effective in providing final solutions in situations of violent conflicts and avert the drift towards the detested hypothetical state of nature of Thomas Hobbes. The paper therefore argues that, Kantian duty ethics provides a complimentary framework within which conflicts can be constructively handled so as to prevent them from degenerating into violence. In other words, the existing paradigm of conflict resolution which lays emphasis on the protection and promotion of rights is expanded to include an adequate emphasis on duty. The work employs analytical method of philosophical inquiry.

10 Which isn't to say, of course, that there are no other reasons for doing so. Environmental justice issues abound to justify preventing climate change.
John Kaiser, “James and Addams on the Moral Dilemmas of Immigration and Warfare”

Despite their interest in peace and their mutual quests for moral substitutes to warfare, neither Jane Addams nor William James could have anticipated today’s heavily knotted relationship between immigration, warfare, and peace. According to a November 2009 report by the Immigration Policy Center, over 50,000 foreign-born immigrants have been naturalized and granted US citizenship in exchange for military service in Iraq and Afghanistan since these conflicts began. This reality raises two key questions: to what extent does immigration as a north American (and also global) phenomenon impede possibilities for peace, and what resources exist in the American philosophical tradition to address the increasingly complex relationship of immigration to warfare (and so also to peace)?

Both thinkers understood the perpetuation of warfare as a distinctly moral problem that had implications for understanding the relationship between ideas (James) and cultural practice as it affects matters of social justice (Addams). And yet, their insights seem to fall short in terms of addressing the current relationship between immigration and warfare given that neither figure ultimately viewed immigration as an obstacle or hindrance to achieving peace. Stated differently, whereas James’ approach lacked any account of the relationship of warfare to immigration as a problem of social justice, Addams’ stated claim that immigrant communities provide a model for social justice does not adequately speak to current realities. When combined and adapted to contemporary conditions, I argue that the principles of pragmatist pacifism found in the work of James and Addams can nonetheless be developed towards a rejuvenated movement for peace.

My argument combines the distinctive contributions of each thinker and so draws upon their broader philosophical claims as a way of re-structuring and adapting their pragmatist and pacifist principles for achieving peace. One the one hand, James’ doctrine of radical empiricism, which I interpret as the idea that the complete or effective understanding of any given idea (e.g., the moral substitution of warfare), necessitates understanding the distant and opposite extremes which the idea assumes, prepares us, first of all, to recognize the relationship of immigration to warfare as a key obstacle towards achieving peace. On the other, Addams’ experience in organizing communities for social justice, especially her claim that we should look to immigrant communities for how to adapt our moral energies away from violence towards peaceful coexistence, gives us a model from which we might yet begin to see immigrants and their communities as the starting-point for challenging warfare given that armed conflict is in part sustained by immigrants to the United States who are willing to perpetuate warfare as a step towards social acceptance and legal inclusion in this country. My conclusion is that the relevance of James and Addams’ search for moral alternatives to warfare nonetheless provides a compelling pragmatist pacifist framework that serves to re-think the challenges of immigration to twenty-first century quests for peaceful alternatives to armed conflict.


Environmental philosophers, most notably eco-feminists like Val Plumwood, have been critical of the Deep Ecologist emphasis on moral extensionism in environmental ethics. Simply put, moral extensionism can be understood as the strategy that seeks to include nature in the moral community by conceptualizing nonhuman entities as extensions of ourselves. I will show first that major criticisms against moral extensionism have failed and that it is within an extensional framework that a philosophy of nonviolence that is inclusive of nature can most reasonably follow.

Aaron Fehir, “The Problem of Conflicting Truth-Claims and the Potential for Peace”

This paper takes up the interconnected problems of religious diversity and religious literalism insofar as these realities are acutely and frequently an impediment to the peace process between peoples of divergent religious traditions. Whether the conflict is between Israelis and Palestinians in Jerusalem, Shias and Sunnis in Iraq, Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, or Buddhists and Muslims in Burma, the role of religion in these various conflicts is difficult to overlook. Accordingly, it is tempting to respond to such violence that religion, no less than skin color or sexual orientation, is not something worth fighting over. But religious fundamentalists cannot and will not accept such a low view of religion. In fact, even many “moderate” religious folks argue that their religion is the only absolutely true religion, and at least at the level of ideas, is something worth fighting for. Consider the Sunday school classic:
I may never march in the infantry, 
Ride in the cavalry, 
Shoot the artillery. 
I may never fly o'er the enemy, 
But I'm in the Lord's Army, yes sir!

Or think of the New Testament description of the amour of God or the Islamic conception of jihad. For better or worse, the language of warfare figures prominently and substantively when it comes to religion. But short of giving up religion altogether, as if it is all just one big delusion to be overcome, a deep and unequivocal commitment to religious pluralism would seem a good way to reign in and tame religious violence.

Religious Pluralism, which says that all religions are at bottom the same, or at least, fighting on the same team, would make violence between religious peoples pointless. If religions can see themselves on the same side of the conflict, e.g. against sin a human poverty, then perhaps they would also see that there really are no religious beliefs worth fighting over. Since all religions are more or less equally true, it would be far better to communicate with one another and learn from one another to reach common ground.

However, this solution runs into a glaring problem: the different religions really are quite different; they clearly don’t all teach the same thing. Each one makes claims that emphatically, and even consciously and intentionally, conflict with the truths proclaimed in others. According to Christians, God is Trinity and Jesus is divine. Islam, on the other hand, teaches that, while Jesus was a great prophet of God, he was by no means divine, and Allah is one; there is no division of parts within him. Religions also differ when it comes to life after death. For many Eastern religions, human beings are caught in vast system of birth and rebirth, and the great majority of human beings will be reincarnated into some new form after this present life. Islam and Christianity, on the other hand, teach that human beings will die only once, and after that, face judgment. There is no “second chance.” What this fact of religious diversity entails is that only one religion can possibly be absolutely true. Perhaps no religion is absolutely and exclusively true, but at most, only one.

In the present paper, I look closely at the problem of conflicting truth-claims as an impediment to the pluralistic solution to interreligious violence. It is argued that the nature of religious truth is such that religions need not be seen as incompatible just because they maintain divergent sets of doctrines. The paper defends and draws primarily on the insights of two sources: the existential philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard and the notion of upaya in Mahayana Buddhism.

James Sterba, “Peace Though Justice”

Peace is both an end worth achieving and a means for getting there. As an end worth achieving, peace is synonymous with justice and as a means for getting there, peace is required by justice. In this paper, I will defend both these links of peace with justice. I will begin with a defense of an account of peace that is synonymous with justice. Peace in this sense is sometimes referred to as positive peace as opposed to negative peace, and, as such, it needs to be defended as a conception of justice. I will pursue this defense by beginning with a libertarian conception of justice, which despite its opposition to war and coercion, is thought to come up short with respect to justice, particularly by welfare liberals and socialists. I will show that this view is mistaken, that a libertarian conception of justice, properly understood, supports the same substantial equality that is supported by welfare liberals and socialists, given a proper understanding of their views. I further show that my argument from a libertarian conception of justice can be generalized to apply to anyone who is simply committed to providing a good argument governing the interpersonal interactions we necessarily have with each other, and so applies to us whether or not we are committed to morality.

In the second part of the paper, I show how this account of peace as justice is required to be implemented through peaceful means despite the fact that the the political and social changes required by this conception of justice are both massive and wide-ranging. I argue that we are required to implement these changes both individually and collectively. Individual implementation involves the recognition that whatever we individually possess above what is necessary to provide a decent life for ourselves and those we personally care about can legitimately be taken from us by others who are in need through no fault of their own. This should lead us to take steps to transfer our present and future surplus, as best we can, so that others can also have a decent life. Individual implementation also involves action by the needy to take from the surplus possessions of the rich what they require for a decent life as well as action by individual “Robin Hoods” assisting the transfer of resources from the wealthy to those in need. Collective implementation, involving appropriate institutions to guarantee that everyone has the resources for a decent life, should be helped along by various forms of nonviolent action such as protest marches,
rallies, picketing, boycotts, strikes, civil disobedience, and sit-ins. Collective implementation should also be helped along by the nonviolent actions of organized groups of Robin Hoods acting on behalf of existing needy people or on behalf of future generations. Thus, ideally in this way, peace as justice would be come to be, implemented, peacefully, both individually and collectively, guided by a deep egalitarianism that alone can be rationally and morally justified.

Jane Fitz-Gibbon, “Corporal Punishment, The Schools, and Nonviolence”

In this paper I look at corporal punishment in US public schools through the lens of nonviolent philosophy. The United States is one of the few western country where there is not a total ban on corporal punishment. The data reveals that, to date, corporal punishment is still legal in nineteen states. The first state to ban corporal punishment was New Jersey in 1867. An attempt to reintroduce it with parental consent was made in Newark NJ in 1894. However this was rejected. This was almost a century before other states considered legislation. Massachusetts disallowed corporal punishment in 1971. The most recent state to ban corporal punishment was New Mexico in 2011. In the latest available data— produced by the U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights—223,190 children were beaten in 2006. These children were beaten mainly with wooden paddles, though other weapons documented at the National Center for the Study of Corporal Punishment and its Alternatives (NCSCPA) include rubber hoses, leather straps and belts, switches, sticks, rods, ropes, straight pins, plastic baseball bats, and arrows. Punching, slapping kicking are also common. The statistics are disproportionately higher for Black students or students with disabilities.

The majority of students punished using corporal punishment were in Texas (51,170). However, if the data is arranged by percentage rather than actual number of students Mississippi becomes the greater offender with 7.6 percent of the student population beaten. The next state is Arkansas with 4.7 percent, closely followed by Alabama with 4.6 percent.

Having looked at the data, I analyze the phenomenon of corporal punishment through the lens of the loving nonviolent philosophy of King, Gandhi, Girard, and Yoder. I apply Barry Gan's (2013) four myths of nonviolence to corporal punishment (the myth of physical violence; the myth of good guys and bad guys; the myth of necessary violence; and the myth of effective punishment).

I conclude that, given the insights of nonviolent philosophy, there is an urgent need to revisit a total ban of corporal punishment in US public schools.

Dennis Rothermel, “Hope, Desperation, and Catastrophe in International Lines of Flight in Four Contemporary Films”

Historians have struggled with explaining the unchronicled decline into a period of cultural obscurity in ancient Greece subsequent to the Bronze Age and prior to the Classical Age. The postulate of a Dorian Invasion to account for the replacement of one form of civilization with another remains dubious in all of its aspects, to include the supposition of one people supplanting another. The “sea-peoples” mentioned in contemporaneous Egyptian texts could be nothing more than people intermingled from the Aegean islands and Peloponnese taking to the sea to find some other place to live in the wake of general social cataclysm of unknown cause.

What we can imagine of that life of the sea-peoples is abject desperation, abandonment of home and native social structure, and exposure to all the dangers of nature and to the unrestrained inclination of theft, pillage, and murder among not just those who are identifiable enemies. It also meant losing all possessions that could not be carried in one’s arms and forgetting all those aspects of culture – literature and artefact – that comprise what people can endeavour to do only when it is possible to thrive. Unlike Virgil’s account of Aeneas, there would not ever be even a fictional chronicling of this life.

The Dorian Invasion may not likely be the only instance of social tumult in the history of human civilization, for which the very means of chronicling the experience is the first thing that is lost.

Along the fringes of contemporary international cinema there have emerged accounts of people propelled into this same horrendous fate of being entirely at sea with everything that could count as the source of happiness, thriving, and survival and thus subject to the vagaries of unfathomable natural forces and to the predatory will of inhospitable strangers. It is only exceptionality that these could be happy stories. That the journey across an expanse of dangerous environment constitutes the substance of such stories provides filmmakers with the need to create both
form and style of cinematic narrative strongly divergent from mainstream norms. These are grim narratives, for which it is peace that is the improbably goal. There are four such films well worthy of exploration in these terms: Cary Fukunaga, *Sin Nombre* (Mexico/USA, 2009), Merzak Allouache, *Harragas* (Algeria/France, 2009), Aki Kaurismaki, *Le Havre* (Finland/France/Germany, 2011), and Maggie Peren, *Die Farbe des Ozeans* (Germany/Spain, 2011).

**Short Bibliography**


**Elina Minnullina and Marc Lucht, “Tolerance, Dialogue, and Interconfessional Harmony in Tatarstan”**

Those interested in understanding the conditions for the peaceful resolution of conflict often turn to the notion of tolerance as an important ingredient of peaceful coexistence. People are different, often those differences relate to a wide range of practices and to passionately held beliefs about what is important, proper, and how lives should be lived and societies organized, and these differing practices and beliefs can bring people into conflict with one another. Tolerance of difference is important in order for us to fall into the trap of attempting to resolve such conflicts violently. Yet the commitment to tolerance itself has risks. One risk is that tolerance is often associated with a cultural or moral relativism that makes justification of the norm of tolerance itself impossible, makes it impossible to identify the intolerable, and, even worse, contributes to an ethical nihilism. This paper will focus on a different risk, a risk connected with interpreting tolerance as a sort of “live and let live” attitude, where the commitment to tolerance enjoins upon one the obligation to refrain from criticizing or attempting to change those beliefs and practices which one finds morally abhorrent. This sort of tolerance threatens to lead a cultural apartheid, among the pernicious consequences of which are the avoidance of the sort of critical, dialogical engagement that makes possible the pursuit of mutual understanding and mutual improvement, and one’s own placing oneself in a position immune to (perhaps beneficial) criticism from others.

This paper will consist in an initial attempt to sketch the outlines of a more satisfactory conception of tolerance. Jointly written by a Russian philosopher and an American philosopher, it will turn to the fact of harmonious interconfessional relations within the Russian Republic of Tatarstan as a source for ideas about the conditions for peaceful coexistence and the best way to conceive of tolerance as a guiding norm. Whereas in many Western countries their numbers are growing, all too often Muslims in those countries find themselves isolated geographically and culturally. The situation in Tatarstan is quite different. There, for hundreds of years, Muslims and Christians have lived together peacefully, churches and mosques stand side by side, and over 30% of marriages cross religious and ethnic lines. Mere proximity cannot explain such non-violent coexistence, for there are many societies where proximity between different religious and ethnic groups does not lead to peace.

Several factors contribute to religious harmony in Tatarstan. One is a consistent commitment to centrist public policy and criticism of extremism from media and political figures as well as cultural leaders. Another is the formation of a Tatar ethnic and national consciousness that incorporates Islamic and Christian influences but also a commitment to a universal discursive space including Russian and Western European identity as well. This discursive space permits the practice of everyday, mundane communicative situations oriented by a respect for otherness and difference. Third is an enduring commitment to interreligious dialogue. Reflecting upon the nature of this dialogue, we intend to shed light on ways in which effective dialogue requires mutual critical engagement and mutual openness to being changed by the conversation, a better approach to fostering a situation of peaceful living together than would be tolerance conceived as a non-critical, non-judgmental attitude of “live and let live” combined with a dogmatic unwillingness to hold one’s own practices up to critical scrutiny.

While restraint in war has, as a practical matter, proved elusive both historically and empirically, the need to immunize innocent persons (non-combatants) from war’s destructiveness while using means of force proportionate to the end of restoring peace have nonetheless met with widespread moral agreement. That agreement also holds legal standing since the non-combatant immunity provision and the proportionality requirement—the *jus in bello* criteria of just war thinking—are today recognized in international law. Violators are subject not only to moral censure, but to war crimes prosecution.

The non-combatant immunity provision and the proportionality requirement that attends to using force by means disproportional to the end of securing justice and peace have focused almost exclusively on restraint in the interests of protecting persons. The question I raise in this paper is, “Is it appropriate to include under this moral restraint an explicit protection of the environment, nature, the biosphere?”

In the pursuit of war goals, belligerents have often subjected nature itself to direct attack (e.g., “scorched earth” policies, water and food poisoning), and even transformed nature into a weapon of continuing and often lingering destruction. The use of the herbicidal defoliant, Agent Orange, in Viet Nam, for instance, while the most profound instance of chemical warfare in history, so affected victims by poisoning water and food supplies that it became a protracted agent of destruction that is even today being passed on through germ lines to cause continued ill health, birth defects (monster births), and early deaths. Agent Orange transformed a direct chemical attack on nature into persistent and unlimited biological warfare. Just as an environmental ethic to address the moral meaning of this aspect of warfare destructiveness could appeal to the *jus in bello* criteria to insist on restraint, *jus in bello* should, in my view, direct itself to the environment as a relevant relational partner deserving immunization from warfare destructiveness.

Accordingly, this paper will defend the following propositions: that nature itself ought to be respected as if it were an immunized non-combatant; that the weaponizing of nature is morally illicit in that it reduces nature to mere instrumentality and eliminates the kind of transcendental options for nature important in diverse philosophical and religious perspectives (e.g., Emerson, forms of Buddhism); and that the transformation of aesthetic landscapes into war environments that continue to kill beyond actual conflict offends any reasonable idea of proportionality in war.

This paper will invoke the ideas of non-combatant immunity and proportionality to argue that the environment itself should be subject to just war restraints and protections. The effect of this is to transform just war thinking into an environmental ethic, one that provides an additional restraint on the use of force to settle human conflict. If the environment cannot be made party to a violent conflict due to such ethical restraint, an additional moral requirement is added that would support the idea of settling conflicts non-violently though negotiation, arbitration, and co-existence.

Duane Cady, “Warism and Environmentalism”

A critical discussion of the US military, fossil fuel consumption, & environmental degradation…

Bill Gay, “Negative Impacts of Militarism on the Environment”

Militarism has been around as long as warfare. Academic and ideological debate on militarism began in the 19th century. After World War II, debate focused on differences in the militarism of developing versus developed nations. However, since 9/11 these debates have largely been pushed into the background as calls for military preparedness to lessen the threat of terrorism are widely taken for granted.

From primitive militarism to totalitarian militarism, a basic definition includes belief in and practice of constant preparation for war and subordination of civil control and interests to the military and their sympathizers. In whatever manner militarism is defined, it is broader than its expressions in imperialism and total war but narrower than problems of civil military relations and warism. While warism and pacifism are opposites, militarism and civilianism, are not opposites since militarism can occur under civilian rule and even in democratic states. Ethical concern about militarism often focuses on peacetime expressions.

Military activity impacts the environment in at least four ways, namely, in the production of military equipment and weapons, in the deployment and testing of military systems, in the use of military force, and in the storage and reprocessing of military waste. Whether these systems and activities are conventional, chemical, biological, or
nuclear, they contribute to environmental degradation. All of these activities pollute the hydrosphere, most also pollute the atmosphere, and testing and warfare additionally pollute the lithosphere and biosphere. Even if protecting national security justifies military systems, this benefit needs to be weighed morally against ecological concerns.

In the first area of military activity, the production of military equipment and weapons directly contributes to environmental degradation. Numerous toxic chemicals are employed in producing conventional weapons. With nuclear weapons all phases of production pose environmental problems.

In the second area, the deployment and testing of military systems also has environmental consequences. For example, the removal of paint from aircraft and oil from their engines both use hazardous chemicals, and all military maneuvers involving petroleum fueled engines release pollutants into the atmosphere.

The third area, the actual use of military force, is the most serious way in which military activity degrades the environment. Virtually all aspects of environmental damage that occur in the prior two stages are repeated on a larger scale during war.

In the fourth area, even the storage and reprocessing of military waste poses environmental problems. In the U.S. alone, military installations cover over 25 million acres onto which numerous toxic substances have been released.

Finally, beyond the four areas in which military activity directly contributes to environmental degradation are additional indirect natural and human factors. In relation to natural factors, natural disasters have resulted in the release of toxic military materials. In relation to human factors, military activity itself is part of a larger social fabric that is damaged by the military-industrial complex.

To counter these negative impacts of militarism on the environment, a coalition is needed that involves, at the least, environmentalists and peace activists.

Wendy Hamblet, “Nature and Human Dwelling”

In Zimbabwe of the 1980s, the killing of a chicken meant not only a special meal for the family that day, but the delivery of cuts of the unfortunate bird as far as the village children could deliver them on foot. When one family had, neighbors had too. Since that time, global capitalism has brought “market reforms” that have devastated that country’s economy, and with the aid of Tony Blair’s cancellation in the late 1990s of the long-delayed colonial compensation funds, promised since independence (1980) to help buy back farms from whites, a new kind of environment has arisen where the “Jewel of Africa” once gleamed—a Hobbesian Hell that lives up to the philosopher’s description: “the condition of man . . . is the condition of war of everyone against everyone.” I don’t know what Zimbabweans do today with their chickens, when they occasionally have one for dinner, but I suspect that conflict theorists, Otomar Bartos and Paul Wehr, are right in their (2002) general forecast that simple communal societies are steadily being eroded, uprooted, and devastated under the steamrolling effects of a globalizing industrialized capitalism.

Conflict theorists warn us that industrialized capitalist societies create a certain kind of human being—fragmented, isolated, alienated people, pitted against each other in fierce competition for jobs and resources and locked into “zero sum games” that produce winners and losers bound only by their common greed and resentment of others. As global trade policies undermine developing nations economically, human values of harmony, fraternity, and compassion are steadily replaced with capitalism’s morally-barren values of efficiency, productivity, and profit. Traditional communal societies, such as the Zimbabwe of the 1980s, are steadily being wiped out and replaced by cutthroat, individualistic, societies of “disciplined” consumers and producers, stripped of their human modes of being-in-the-world.

Holding onto our humanity under the weight of capitalism’s morally-vapid inertia will require a focused, mindful dedication to more human ways of dwelling together on our green planet. Many psychologists join environmentalists in coupling human values with care for the earthly environment. Bill Plotkin, for example (2008) argues that communal values and a sense of wholeness can be cultivated in a fragmented world by forging a connection with the natural world and tending the mother as she tends us.
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