KEVIN J. AYOTTE

AESTHETIC RHETORIC IN PLATO'S PHAEDRUS

Plato's Phaedrus is one of the best-known classical texts addressing the issues of love, beauty, and rhetoric. Contemporary scholars have interpreted this dialogue in two principal ways. The first reading views Plato as continuing his project of the Gorgias, the categorical denial of an "art" of rhetoric. The second reading focuses on the possibility of a "philosophical rhetoric," a rhetoric subordinate to philosophy but indispensable in persuading audiences to believe dialectically secured truths. While both of these readings find warrant in the language of the Phaedrus, both tend to leave out of account the fact that Socrates' second speech on love stipulates a divine, not a human, audience. For Socrates, the philosophically driven orator does not seek to persuade the masses, in the sense of convincing them to believe something, but rather to help them remember their original sight of the perfect form of beauty. A third reading proposed by this paper analyzes divine madness as the force behind Socrates' conception of aesthetically beautiful rhetoric. In this reading, the mythical account of the soul's understanding of true beauty parallels Plato's view of the proper relationship between rhetoric and philosophy.
A careful consideration of the divine audience posited by Socrates suggests that the *Phaedrus* is in fact a strong condemnation of the very notion of rhetoric as persuasion, representing a powerful defense of philosophy by Plato against the threat posed by rhetoric.

The reading of the *Phaedrus* as a dismissal of rhetoric is well-known to classical scholars. A. E. Taylor, for example, suggests that the *Phaedrus* continues to propound “the verdict that the sort of thing the professional teachers from Tisias to Thrasymachus profess to expound is not a science but a mere ‘trick’ or ‘knack’….In adding that a thorough knowledge of a subject-matter and a sound knowledge of the psychology of the public addressed furnish a really scientific basis for a worthy and effective style, Plato is saying nothing inconsistent with the results of the *Gorgias.*”¹ But if we consider the second reading of this dialogue, the first is insufficient; Socrates does propose the alternative of a “true” or philosophically informed rhetoric. The basis for such a rhetoric is dialectic, which would ensure that the orator knows the truth of the subject about which she speaks. The need for rhetoric envisioned by the second interpretation, then, derives from the philosopher’s desire to communicate the truths gleaned by dialectical investigation. Richard Weaver, in *The Ethics of Rhetoric*, describes the emotive force of figurative language as the means by which rhetoric can make the “dry understanding” of dialectic appealing and accessible to mass audiences. Weaver also argues that rhetoric is a necessary complement to philosophy because worldly action is motivated primarily by rhetorical discourse.² Weaver’s reading of the *Phaedrus* implies that meditative contemplation does not suffice for audiences living in the actual world; the passionate fervor of inspired oratory is necessary to convince audiences to *live* in a manner consistent with virtue. Although Weaver’s insight is consistent with part of the reading I propose, the referent of his argument is still “[a]ny piece of persuasion,”³ and the concept of persuasion as the convincing of audiences seems to be
disallowed by Socrates’ stipulation of a divine audience.

After the fashion of Weaver’s reading, other examples of this second principal interpretation tend to rely upon an unproblematized assumption of persuasion as it is discussed by Socrates throughout the dialogue. G. R. F. Ferrari contends that Plato admits that “discursive argument alone cannot furnish Socrates with an adequate means of persuading the adherents of rhetoric to become philosophical, but that he must in addition have recourse to the persuasive power of example.”

James Murray, explaining that philosophers may resort to rhetorical deception as a means of communicating the truth through “Plato’s true rhetoric,” still draws from what he sees Socrates saying about “persuasive speech in general.” A recent article by Eric Ramsey concludes that Plato modified his “assault on rhetoric” because he “recognized that his metaphysics and his concerns for justice mean little in the silence of a world without discourse.”

The essay by Edwin Black shrewdly notes that “Plato’s attack is limited only to a particular practice of rhetoric,” but his conclusion still presumes a Platonic conception of rhetoric as the convincing of an unenlightened mass audience. Black writes that “[m]oral and metaphysical truths are to be rhetorically disseminated, not alone for the maintenance of political order, but so that they will be believed for their own sakes as well. Young men who are without philosophy, and so are not yet equipped to attain true knowledge, would be attracted to the study of philosophy by ‘persuasion.’” The language of “dissemination” suggests that persuasion is a function of information handed down to an audience, which would then somehow be convinced of the truth of the philosopher’s words. Graeme Nicholson locates precisely the sort of human audience for philosophical rhetoric envisioned by this second reading, concluding that “the true address, and therefore the true form of rhetoric, would be aimed at the individual, or conceivably a small group of like-minded persons, such as we see in Socratic dialogue.” This formulation clearly implies that the “true rhetoric” is to be understood in the context of persuasion, albeit a
convincing of the audience to believe dialectically derived truth rather than sophistical falsehood.

The tension between the second traditional reading of the *Phaedrus* and the interpretation I propose is underscored by W. H. Thompson’s explanation of the second speech of Socrates. According to Thompson, that final oration on love “is intended to prove, by a living example, that the art [of rhetoric]...is capable of being turned by the philosopher to the better purpose of clothing in an attractive dress the results of his more abstruse speculations; and also of stimulating the minds of his disciples, if only by working in them that wonder which...is the fountain of all philosophy.”10 I discuss the latter part of this explication, that the “true rhetoric” would function as a mental stimulant to philosophical investigation, more fully below. It is the first element of Thompson’s analysis, the view of aesthetically beautiful rhetoric as simply an “attractive dress,” which poses difficulty. As with portions of Weaver’s analysis, and the second reading in general, the lack of attention to the audience specified by Socrates’ second speech problematizes any reading of Plato’s “true rhetoric” as consciously manipulated persuasion. The reading of the *Phaedrus* that I propose draws from both readings I have identified, but sees the “philosophical rhetoric” suggested by Socrates as a complex defense of metaphysical truth based upon the true beauty of love. Reformed according to Plato’s standards, rhetoric would no longer be conceived of as the persuasion of audiences, but rather is redefined specifically within the context of Plato’s metaphysical and philosophical schema. Rhetoric, as presented by Socrates in the *Phaedrus*, describes the figurative and passionate language of a divinely inspired philosopher speaking to please a divine audience, not the clever language of a selfish orator speaking to persuade an audience of mere humans.

In the *Gorgias*, Socrates observes that “rhetoric apparently is a creator of a conviction that is persuasive but not instructive about right and wrong”(455a1-2).11 Carrying this statement
to the *Phaedrus*, we see the further development of the Platonic distinction between instruction, as a showing of things the way they really are, and rhetoric as the persuasion of audiences toward belief without true knowledge. *Phaedrus* answers Socrates’ question on the orator’s need for true knowledge, explaining that the rhetorician need not “know what is truly good or noble, but what will be thought so, since it is on the latter, not the former, that persuasion depends” (260a3-5). Similarly, Socrates affirms that “the art of speech displayed by one who has gone chasing after beliefs, instead of knowing the truth, will be...in fact no art at all” (262c1-3). These statements have been combined by proponents of the second reading of the dialogue to conclude that all Plato demands is that rhetoric be practiced by one who knows the truth. For example, Socrates declares that Lysias’ speech, and Socrates’ first speech praising the non-lover, are flawed because they treat the god of Love as evil, something a divine being cannot be. Yet it is not simply their untruth that is deserving of condemnation, but additionally “the most exquisite folly of parading their pernicious rubbish as though it were good sense because it might deceive a few miserable people and win their applause” (242e4-243a1). In order to understand Plato’s conception of rhetorical persuasion more fully, my reading calls for an examination of the audience for Socrates’ second speech on love, and the manner in which the knowledge described in this speech might affect this audience.

There are two audiences stipulated by Socrates’ second speech. The young Phaedrus represents the typical audience: he is innocent of true knowledge about love and easily impressed by the novelty of artful rhetorical techniques. As Nicholson observes, “the eager response of Phaedrus to the speech of Lysias tells us about the continuing glamour of the whole rhetorical movement over a period of decades.” In the course of the dialogue, Phaedrus is disabused of his illusions as Socrates capitalizes on his naïve fascination with intoxicating rhetoric by instructing him through dialectic. The second, and far more important, audience for Socrates are
the gods. Socrates claims that the wise orator “should exert not for the sake of speaking to and
dealing with his fellow men, but that he may be able to speak what is pleasing to the
gods” (273e5-7). If we are to take Socrates’ second speech as a metaphor for Plato’s view of
rhetoric, the divine audience problematizes notions of rhetoric as persuasion. The gods do not
need to be persuaded of anything because they are already perfect, nor philosophically
instructed, being already wise, but only pleased. As we will see, the instruction of the mass
public audience, personified in Phaedrus, follows naturally from the inspiration of a
philosophical oratory on love designed only to please the gods.

Before calling explicitly for oratory addressed to the gods, Socrates provides an allegory
identifying the divine audience through the myth of the cicada choir. He admonishes Phaedrus
of the need for philosophical dialectic when he warns that “if they [the cicadas] were to see us
two behaving like ordinary folk at midday, not conversing but dozing lazy-minded under their
spell, they would very properly have the laugh of us” (259a1-3). As Ferrari explains, we should
“consider more closely the pleasures that the cicadas purvey. According to Socrates’ figurative
description, theirs is just that verbal virtuosity...which Phaedrus ranks most highly: they both
‘sing and converse.’” 14 Socrates’ elaboration of the myth, however, provides a distinction
between rhetorical song and dialectical conversation. The cicadas were once human, but became
so enamored with the beautiful song of the Muses that they forgot to eat, and eventually starved
to death. The Muses rewarded the humans’ devotion by reincarnating them as “singing” cicadas.
The figurative beauty of rhetoric is metaphorically represented by the pure musicality of the
Muses, yet philosophy offers succor from the cicadas’ fate. Socrates continues, suggesting that
if the cicadas “see us conversing and steering clear of their bewitching Siren song, they might
feel respect for us and grant us that boon which heaven permits them to confer upon
mortals” (259a5-259b1). Specifically, “[t]o the eldest, Calliope, and to her next sister, Urania,
they tell of those who live a life of philosophy and so do honor to the music of those twain whose theme is the heavens and all the story of gods and men, and whose song is the noblest of them all”(259d3-7). While the cicadas are the bearers of Socrates’ oratory to the gods, the ultimate audience for his discourse on love is divine in nature.

The method and content of that oratory is philosophical dialectic. Socrates confirms this when he states that “even as the mind of a god is nourished by reason and knowledge, so also is it with every soul that has a care to receive her proper food”(247c8-247d2); humans would not starve, as the cicadas did, if they relied on truth as their food. The stipulation of the gods as the audience for Socrates’ oratory highlights Plato’s understanding of the goal of “philosophical rhetoric.” The myth of the cicadas offers one level of Plato’s argument against rhetoric as persuasion. The goal for Plato is to elevate the human audience through the instruction afforded by discourse that is pleasing to the gods. By contrast, the sophists’ use of rhetoric does not try to help the audience understand their relationship to the cosmos and so transcend their limitations.

The other level of Plato’s condemnation of rhetorical persuasion can be discerned through close attention to the manner in which true knowledge is achieved in the course of Socrates’ second speech on love. According to him, “such understanding is a recollection of those things which our souls beheld aforetime as they journeyed with their god”(249c2-3). Socrates describes the soul as having known truth when it moved with the gods, and then forgetting that knowledge in its mortal incarnation. Learning, as a result of dialectical investigation, then comes from remembering those truths which the human soul has forgotten. It is this path to true understanding which lies at the crux of Plato’s condemnation of rhetorical persuasion; knowledge comes from the remembrance of previously known truth, provoked by philosophical demonstration, not the belief in a persuasive argument. According to Plato, it is this knowledge of truth possessed by the philosopher-orator that inspires the passion and
figurative discourse that other scholars have identified as the pathos of rhetoric needed by dialectic, rather than any conscious persuasive technique on the part of the speaker. As Socrates explains, “[s]tanding aside from the busy doings of mankind, and drawing nigh to the divine, he [the philosopher] is rebuked by the multitude as being out of his wits, for they know not that he is possessed by a deity” (249c11-249d3). Rhetoric, as conceived by Plato, is an effect of the divine madness brought on by the philosopher's recognition and recollection of truth, not an artifice intended to convince.

This reading is supported by the allegorical myth of the soul’s flight following the lover’s rapture when first seeing his beloved. At that moment, the knowledge of beauty parallels the manner in which an audience apprehends truth from philosophical oratory. The beauty of the boy’s physical appearance provokes the divine madness that accompanies the soul’s recollections of the true Form of beauty. Socrates declares that “when he that loves beauty is touched by such madness he is called a lover. Such a one, as soon as he beholds the beauty of this world, is reminded of true beauty, and his wings begin to grow” (249d7-249e3). The lover, analogically the philosopher, is able to recognize beauty in the world having dialectically pondered the meaning of love, and consequently his soul flies toward the truth of the Forms.

The description of the beloved’s role in this exchange provides a metaphor for understanding the way in which Plato’s “philosophical rhetoric” disallows persuasion as the means by which audiences learn to recognize the truth. The divine madness which overtakes the lover at the sight of his beloved is itself an aesthetic encounter that provokes a similar recollection of truth in the beloved as audience to the lover’s inspiration. Socrates states that “part of it [the ‘flood of passion’] is absorbed within him [the lover], but when he can contain no more the rest flows away outside him,...so the stream of beauty turns back and re-enters the eyes of the fair beloved. And so by the natural channel it reaches his soul and gives it fresh vigor,
watering the roots of the wings and quickening them to growth, whereby the soul of the beloved, in its turn, is filled with love” (255c3-255d2). The lover becomes a site of methexis, a site in which the lover’s participation in something beautiful, the truth of love, becomes beautiful as well, serving as the aesthetic prompt for the beloved's remembrance. In Socrates’ words, “his lover is as it were a mirror in which he [the beloved] beholds himself” (255d5-6). As Ferrari argues, Socrates uses the mythical allegory because “in order to change his soul, and the souls of his audience (or beloved), it would not be sufficient to describe the soul as it is, even if he were capable of doing so; he must in addition paint a picture—say what the soul is like—in which he and his audience can recognize themselves: only so can the enquiry be meaningful for them.”

Ferrari’s statement reinforces this reading of the Phaedrus. The term “recognize,” literally to “cognize again,” supports the argument that Plato’s analogical placement of rhetoric in the meeting of lover and beloved is an extension of his defense of philosophy against the abuses of sophistical persuasion.

If Plato’s conception of the “true rhetoric” disallows persuasion of human audiences toward mere belief, it becomes imperative to identify those qualities of aesthetic beauty in Socrates’ second oration which distinguish it from the figurative language and passionate fervor of the sophists who use rhetoric simply to beguile the masses. Socrates identifies formalistic flaws in Lysias’ speech, for example, that produce an aesthetically deficient or ugly discourse. According to Socrates, Lysias’ speech is repetitive, in that “it seemed to me that he said the same things several times over” (235a3-4). Moreover, Lysias constructed the discourse in a disorganized manner, defying the logical potential of an orderly development of ideas constituted by an introduction, dialectically secured definitions, exposition, and conclusion. Socrates declares that “he [Lysias] goes about it like a man swimming on his back, in reverse, and starts from the end instead of the beginning” (264a5-6). Perhaps the most egregious stylistic
error, in Socrates’ estimation, is Lysias’ ignorance of proportionality in the organization of his speech. Socrates remains adamant that “any discourse ought to be constructed like a living creature, with its own body, as it were; it must not lack either head or feet; it must have a middle and extremities so composed as to suit each other and the whole work” (264c3-6). Whereas unnecessary repetition might be annoying and demonstrate a lack of imagination, disproportion in the organization of the speech represents an affront to oratory as a model of the beauty found in the form of the human body. The incontrovertible beauty of the human body is demonstrated throughout the artwork of classical Greek society, particularly in the representation of the gods as perfections of the human form. By contradicting the “natural” order of discourse as a mirror of the body, Lysias fails to make rhetoric aesthetically beautiful even on formalistic grounds.

Having identified the structural flaws in Lysias’ speech, Socrates proceeds to correct the disorganization and disorderliness of that discourse in his first speech praising the non-lover. In this manner, Socrates provides a partial corrective for rhetoric in the sense that Nicholson identifies, where rhetoric is, in addition to the practice of speech-making, “the art, the technē, of fashioning speeches consciously according to norms.” As Nicholson observes, the goal of Socrates’ first speech in praise of the non-lover “is to show that a speech to the same effect could be delivered with greater attention to order, arrangement, and the logical disposition of argument.” Given that Socrates is correct in claiming that aesthetically beautiful rhetoric must be modeled after the natural beauty of the organization of the human body, Socrates’ first speech is at least an improvement upon the rhetorical style employed in Lysias’ speech. Yet the beauty of formalistic orderliness is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the aesthetic beauty of Plato’s “true,” or philosophical, rhetoric. Socrates interrupts his first speech because of its treatment of the god of love as an “evil thing” (242e3); that speech falls short of the aesthetic beauty of “true rhetoric,” despite the logical elegance of its organizational form,
because it is untruthful.

Weaver identifies another problem with the rhetorical style of Lysias’ speech in its lack of passion and its overly scientific dissection of the non-lover’s attributes. According to Weaver, “these points of superiority [identified by Lysias in the non-lover] correspond to those of ‘semantically purified’ speech. By ‘semantically purified speech’ we mean the kind of speech approaching pure notation in the respect that it communicates abstract intelligence without impulsion.”\(^{18}\) In Weaver’s analysis, “instead of passion, it offers the serviceability of objectivity.”\(^{19}\) Weaver's observation, while accurate, fails to isolate the distinction made by Socrates, and consequently Plato, between the passionate eloquence of a sophist like Gorgias and the divinely inspired rapture of a philosopher brought to “madness” by knowledge of the truth of love. The identification of the divine audience for Socrates’ second speech provides such a distinction. The aesthetic beauty claimed by Plato for the “true rhetoric” is derived ultimately from the philosophical truth of its subject-matter, which produces both the passion of divine madness in the orator and the passion of the lover and beloved in the remembrance of true beauty.

Weaver is correct in his description of the value of passionate and figurative language for moving the soul of the listener, and that such movement is encouraged through the analogical operation of rhetoric, but it is the divine nature of Socrates’ intended audience that eventually enables the souls of the human audience to grow wings. And it is in the end the philosopher’s purported encounter with truth, not merely the rhetorician’s ability to speak figuratively and emotionally, that results in the aesthetic beauty of Plato’s “true rhetoric.” In fact, it is the absolute deficiency of rhetoric, of language itself, in relation to philosophical truth that demands the analogical function of rhetoric and relegates rhetoric to only an effect (in Plato’s eyes) of philosophical truth. As Weaver himself explains, “rhetorical speech is madness to the extent that
it departs from the line which mere sanity lays down. There is always in its statement a kind of excess or deficiency which is immediately discernable when the test of simple realism is applied. Simple realism operates on a principle of equation or correspondence....Any excess or deficiency on the part of the representation invokes the existence of the world of symbolism, which simple realism must deny."

Because language cannot be perfectly referential in representing the truth of love, the divine inspiration of the philosopher produces an analogical or allegorical account that is beautiful enough to inspire the listening audience to seek the intellectual truth of love itself. In this sense, Socrates’s second oration, and Plato’s “true rhetoric” in general, draws the attention of the human audience with the aesthetic beauty of its divinely inspired rhetoric. But because language necessarily fails to represent truth in its entirety, the analogical mechanism of rhetoric deflects the audience’s thinking toward the divine truth of love. In Weaver’s words, “the analogy proceeds by showing that the position being urged resembles or partakes of something greater and finer.”

It is evident that Weaver’s project seeks to bring rhetoric and dialectic together, in an attempt to bridge the chasm between philosophy and rhetoric. His analysis of the operation of rhetorical analogy seems consistent with Plato’s understanding of the operation of aesthetically beautiful rhetoric upon the minds of the human audience. Yet, Weaver’s assumption that Plato’s “true rhetoric” constitutes a “persuasion” of the human audience remains problematic. Rhetorical figuration and passion do function, in Plato’s *Phaedrus*, to move the human soul toward goodness by employing the aesthetic beauty of rhetorical analogy as a bridge over mortals’ forgetfulness of the truth of love. Weaver writes that “rhetoric moves the soul with a movement which cannot finally be justified logically. It can only be valued analogically with reference to some supreme image. Therefore when the rhetorician encounters some soul ‘sinking beneath the double load of forgetfulness and vice’ he seeks to re-animate it by holding
up to its sight the order of presumptive goods.”22 It is Weaver’s assertion that such rhetoric is accessible to the mere “rhetorician” that is contradicted by Socrates’ specification of divine madness as the impetus for truly beautiful discourse. When Weaver states that “rhetoric at its truest seeks to perfect men by showing them better versions of themselves, links in that chain extending up toward the ideal, which only the intellect can apprehend and only the soul have affection for,”23 he elides Plato’s distinction that it is only the philosopher’s grasp of the truth of that ideal which produces the aesthetically beautiful rhetoric indicated by divine madness. As Thompson says of divine madness, it is the “one which raises a man above...his normal self.”24

If we are to accept Plato’s analogical view of rhetoric, it is vital that we strive for a reading that accounts for the audience and method of understanding postulated in the dialogue. As Socrates says in concluding his speech, “we painted, after a fashion, a picture of the lover’s experience, in which perhaps we attained some degree of truth,...the blend resulting in a discourse which had some claim to plausibility, or shall we say a mythical hymn of praise...of my master and yours too, Phaedrus, that god of love”(265b6-265c3). That oration is plausible, in the sense of its rhetorical potential to instruct Phaedrus on the truth of love, because it is truthful. It is orderly and well-proportioned, as well as rhetorically figurative and passionate, at least partly because of the conscious crafting of the orator Socrates. But the philosophical discourse is ultimately aesthetically beautiful and passionate, to the point of divine madness, because it describes the truth of love. Socrates’ second speech, as Dougal Blyth argues, “is written so as itself to provoke that philosophical erōs for understanding which the myth then describes.”25 While one could speculate on Plato’s intentions in writing the dialogue in the manner he did, it is clear from Socrates’ description of divine madness that the conscious intent of persuasion by the orator is not the mechanism through which audiences might be brought to know the truth. Rather, the dialectical presentation of truth produces a divine madness inspired
by the gods, which has the effect of producing an aesthetically beautiful discourse - the “true rhetoric.” Consequently, as Albert Levi has suggested, “[t]he right destiny of speech is not the legal or legislative persuasion of the multitude, but the discourse about justice or friendship or nobility between the dialectician and his pupil which yields the same sort of immortality as a noble love.”

Socrates does not suggest that public audiences can not be brought to see the truth. Rather, he allows for their instruction by suggesting that a divinely inspired discourse should inspire merely human audiences if it is good enough to please the gods. In his words, “a man of sense ought never to study the gratification of his fellow slaves, save as a minor consideration, but that of his most excellent masters”(274a1-3). The masters to whom he is referring are the gods themselves, where the education of the masses, Phaedrus’ “fellow slaves,” follows from the philosopher’s inspired dialectical demonstration of truth. “Those lesser objects also, if you would have them, can best be attained, so our argument assures us, as a consequence of the greater”(274a5-7). Such a discourse of philosophical rhetoric would not aim at the persuasion of anyone, but rather the demonstration of knowledge that can provoke the audience to remember truth and seek to understand the Forms.

The reading of the _Phaedrus_ I have proposed sees Plato as trying to eliminate the threat of persuasive rhetoric in order to defend philosophical life, a path he viewed as the only hope of saving Athens from the depredations of the Sophists. By specifying a divine, rather than a human, audience for Socrates’ allegorical performance of philosophical rhetoric, Plato challenges the view of rhetoric as the means of persuading a mass audience. For him, knowledge comes from the remembrance of truth provoked by philosophical demonstration rather than by clever arguments aiming at “persuasion.” The second reading of the _Phaedrus_ provides valuable insights as to why aesthetically beautiful discourse appeals to audiences, with
its passion and innovative use of linguistic figuration. This interpretation, however, is insufficient because it claims that Plato believes that philosophers need to persuade audiences. The first reading of the *Phaedrus* as a dismissal of rhetoric may therefore come closer to the mark, if we define rhetoric as the convincing of audiences. But it would also be imprudent to ignore Socrates’ acknowledgment of the instructive potential of aesthetically beautiful oratory brought on by divine madness. As a means of dismissing the rhetoric of public persuasion, Plato isolates “true rhetoric” to aesthetic beauty because his philosophy posits a divine origin for that beauty in a cosmic truth inaccessible to those with mere belief.
NOTES


3. Weaver, p. 17.


14. Ferrari, p. 28.

15. Ferrari, pp. 122-123. Italics in original.


18. Weaver, p. 7.


21. Weaver, p. 18.

22. Weaver, p. 23.

23. Weaver, p. 25.
24. Thompson, p. 156.


KEVIN J. AYOTTE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATION
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH